THE (TROUBLING) CONFUSION BETWEEN SEX AND GENDER

This contribution was written for publication in the volume Mélanges in Honor of Pierre Murat, published by Dalloz and LexisNexis, 2025, pp. 305–324.

Jean-Louis RENCHON, Professor Emeritus at UCLouvain and UCLouvain-Saint-Louis – Brussels, Attorney at the Brussels Bar.

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INTRODUCTION

1. We can never express enough admiration for our colleague Pierre MURAT.

Throughout his remarkable academic career, he has consistently combined scientific rigor with deeply humanistic thinking. If I add to that his sense of friendship—and I cannot fail to mention the two trips I was able to organize, thanks to Pierre, for our UCLouvain master’s students in notarial law in Grenoble, and our memorable evenings with his students in a Vercors inn or in the barn provided by his winemaker neighbor—Pierre embodies for me the noblest ideal of a vocation and responsibility for an academic.

2. In this tribute volume, I intend to address a theme that is undeniably debated and, moreover, provokes controversy.

That is not a reason to forbid ourselves from “thinking,” by questioning what is at least “troubling” (1).

I simply hope not to drift too far from the type of reflection that Professor Pierre MURAT so often offered us.

3. In a short number of years, in our Western societies, a confusion of the concepts of sex and gender has occurred, as if they were increasingly no longer two distinct notions, as if gender equated with sex, as if sex had dissolved into gender…

This confusion, which Pierre MURAT had notably highlighted in one of his most recent publications (2), has become widespread, both in everyday language and in legal language (§ 1). It has brought about a set of consequences that had probably not been sufficiently anticipated but which prove, at the very least, problematic (§ 2).

(1) It will immediately be noticed that the title of this contribution refers to what Judith Butler called, in a frequently cited work, “Gender Trouble.”

§ 1. A widespread confusion

A. The gradual rise of confusion

Until recently, one would not have conceived of using any term other than “sex” in French to designate men and women. Simone de Beauvoir—whose place in the 20th-century Western struggle for women’s emancipation and gradual establishment of equality between men and women is undeniable—titled her most famous work Le Deuxième Sexe [“The Second Sex”], while Françoise Héritier used the concept of the “differential valence of the sexes” to analyze the social pre-eminence of men over women.

The concept of “sex” refers to the biological differences between men and women and thus allows for the distinction between males and females based on those biological differences—most notably those that predispose them to differing reproductive functions. Given these distinctive characteristics, there are two sexes in the human species: males belong to the male sex and females to the female sex. This remains so self-evident that the first question that continues to arise spontaneously among relatives and friends at a child’s birth is almost invariably, “Is it a boy or a girl?”

This is also the legal meaning of “sex”—when a child’s sex is immediately recorded in his birth certificate. The identification of the child’s sex as male or female corresponds to the biological characteristics distinguishing a boy from a girl. This determination is based on the assessment of the physician who issues the required certificate for the birth registration. We will, of course, see that this legal meaning—identical to that in everyday usage—has become problematic today, but in a child’s birth certificate, this meaning continues to prevail.

By contrast, the term “gender,” when used to describe relations between men and women, has a very different meaning. It is, moreover, a term used in everyday language in multiple situations: “this kind of person,” “that literary genre,” “that looks bad,” or “a unique experience of its kind.” Applied specifically to men and women, the term has come to refer to traits other than biological ones, which human civilizations have generally recognized and attributed to men and women respectively. In this sense, gender corresponds to what a society supposes or considers to be masculine or feminine—or at least more masculine or more feminine. These are thus cultural and social representations of masculinity or femininity, created or “constructed” within a society. Some of these constructions have referred to biological differences—e.g., the assumption that women are “meant” to be mothers, or that women are more sensitive than men—but others have most often been ideological productions reinforcing domination by men in patriarchal societies.

What has been termed “gender studies” has therefore sought to identify how, in history, certain attributes, roles, behaviors, and statuses have been assigned to each sex to justify systemic inequalities in male-female relations and male dominance over women. Such analysis does not necessarily challenge the existence of biological differences between men and women. Its aim is to deconstruct what had been presented as inherently biologically linked, when these were, in fact, arbitrary social constructs imposed on women by men.

From this perspective, one has identified so-called “gender stereotypes,” which may be descriptive or prescriptive: inclinations, expressions, and behaviors expected of men or women in line with cultural expectations. These stereotypes have rightly been described as “oppressive” and thus targeted for elimination—though sometimes portrayed in a caricatured manner. We will not address here whether the biological differences between men and women necessarily entail differences in their approach to existence or world relations, which remains a matter of controversy.

What is noteworthy, however, is that just as many cultural representations of feminine and masculine gender have been progressively deconstructed in democratic societies, the term “gender” has strangely been substituted for “sex” to describe men and women, their relations, and the way society organizes these relations. We suddenly speak of gender equality rather than sex equality, we see positions titled “minister for gender equality.” Although not universal, references to relations between “genders” have become frequent, as if the concept of sex were no longer relevant—less central than gender (i.e., cultural representations)—to distinguishing men from women, even though those representations were precisely what had been socially constructed and thus subject to deconstruction. The confusion between sex and gender was thus well underway…

Another development has occurred: the emergence of the concept of “gender identity.”

While “gender” refers to the cultural and societal construction of masculinity or femininity, “gender identity” pertains to how an individual personally perceives themselves as masculine or feminine. It is the individual’s own gender, which may not correspond to societal representations or biological sex. In such cases, the person’s gender does not align with their sex.

Gender identity was developed to designate, a priori, the identification of a person with a masculine or feminine gender—or possibly neither. It is about the person’s internal perception of their gender, whether aligned or not with their biological sex.

We thus speak of “cisgender” individuals, whose gender identity matches their sex, and “transgender” individuals, whose identity does not match their sex.

However, confusion regarding transgender individuals arose when their gender identity led to the belief that they “belonged” to the other sex recorded on their birth certificate—thus conflating gender with sex.

In the medical field, this divergence between gender and biological sex was first recognized as “gender incongruence” or “gender dysphoria.” Even the term “psychological sex” was used to express this psychic identification with a gender other than assigned sex. But calling it “psychological sex” already departed from the biological meaning of sex.

From this point (see infra, no.22), one could more easily transition from “psychological sex” to “legal sex”—separate from biological sex.

It has never been clear—especially since the concept of self-determination of gender (and sex) emerged in our legal systems—whether gender dysphoria stems from an unconscious internal experience, beyond one’s choice, or if it should be viewed as a personal freedom to determine one’s gender identity.

This question is today more complex, given the recognition of the brain’s plasticity; gender dysphoria may have genetic, endocrine, environmental, cultural, emotional, or relational causes, including influences from others or social networks, especially for children or adolescents. Meanwhile, legislation has increasingly recognized the right to self-determine one’s gender (and even sex) solely on personal choice, while some transgender individuals claim broad access to medical care and full reimbursement, asserting that their dysphoria is involuntary.

B. A specific manifestation of the sex–gender confusion: Belgium’s legal evolution on sex change

The evolution of Belgian legislation on “sex change”

15. The transformation over a ten-year span of Belgian legislation regarding what was then referred to as “sex change” — and which the legislator now calls a “modification of sex registration” — offers a clear illustration of the growing confusion between sex and gender.

16. When the Belgian legislator adopted the law of May 10, 2007[^16], the medical condition was still referred to as “transsexualism.”

Because of the deep internal discord a person experienced between their gender and their sex — to the point of requesting their sexed body be adapted to their gender — doctors granted the possibility, once assured of the person’s psychological adaptation, to follow treatments (hormonal and surgical, often particularly invasive) aimed at aligning their “sex” with their gender identity.

This process was referred to as “sexual reassignment.” In truth, it would have been more accurate to call it a “sexed reassignment.”[^15]

17. In 2007, the Belgian legislator decided to allow these individuals, after their reassignment, to legally change the mention of their sex by making a formal declaration to the civil registrar.

They had to provide two medical certificates — one from a psychiatrist, the other from a surgeon — confirming that they had undergone, “to the extent medically possible and justified,” a “sexual reassignment” that made them correspond — at least in part — to the opposite sex from that recorded on their birth certificate, and that as a result of this reassignment, they could no longer conceive children in accordance with their “previous” sex.

In this context, no one really questioned whether the person’s “sex” had truly changed. The sexual reassignment was seen as sufficient for considering that their sex had effectively changed, especially since they could no longer procreate according to their birth sex.

It was thus understood that their actual sex, as traditionally defined, had “become” the opposite of what was originally stated in the birth record. A woman had thus “become” a man, and a man had “become” a woman — without much objection, since their transformation was at least partially achieved through hormonal and surgical treatment.

18. Then, as we know, everything was rethought — though perhaps not as clearly as claimed.

Two main considerations led to a major shift.

On one hand, respect for an individual’s physical integrity led to the conclusion that the State could not require someone, who identifies with a gender different from their sex, to undergo medical treatment resulting in sterilization in order to obtain legal recognition of that identity[^17].

On the other hand — and this marks a true upheaval in the way transsexualism was viewed — the Belgian legislator adopted the perspective (also reflected in European and international bodies) that gender dysphoria was not a medical disorder, and that the situation of transsexual individuals (now referred to as “transgender” persons[^18]) had to be demedicalized.

It was therefore decided that everyone should be able to self-determine, having the freedom not only to define their gender identity but also to change the recorded sex on civil registries — without any required medical condition[^19], or even criteria relating to physical appearance.

19. The current wording of Article 135/1 of the Belgian Civil Code[^20] is therefore as follows:

“Any Belgian adult or emancipated minor[^21], or any foreigner registered in the population registry, who is convinced that the sex mentioned in their birth certificate does not correspond to their intimately lived gender identity, may make a declaration of this conviction to the civil registrar.”

If the person returns to the civil registrar no earlier than three months and no later than six months after this declaration — and in the absence of any objection from the Public Prosecutor[^22] — the registrar will automatically issue a certificate of modification of sex registration.

The only constraint imposed by the 2017 law was that this modification would be irreversible, except under exceptional circumstances assessed by the family court.

20. The confusion between sex and gender then became complete — even in the legal language itself — since a person’s gender identity could become the sole criterion for their legal sex. Their gender is their sex.

A woman who considers herself to be of the male gender can now legally be recognized as of the male sex; likewise, a man identifying as of the female gender can be recognized as of the female sex, even though they retain all biological and physical characteristics of their original sex[^23].

21. Furthermore, this legislation was partially struck down by the Belgian Constitutional Court[^24] on the grounds that, by not allowing transgender people with a “fluid” or “non-binary” gender identity to regularly update their registered sex, or to have a legal identity that is neither male nor female, the law discriminated against them compared to other transgender individuals.

However, without yet resolving the issue of how to address the unconstitutionality for non-binary people, the Belgian legislator repealed, through a law dated July 20, 2023, the provision stating that the change in sex registration was, in principle, irreversible.

22. To justify this legal assimilation of sex with gender, legal scholars have introduced the concept of “legal sex”[^25], which is to be distinguished from biological sex.

The assimilation of gender identity with sex would then be limited to this so-called legal sex, which could even be expanded beyond just male and female.

Biological sex, once completely dissociated from legal sex, would be reduced to just another personal datum — comparable to other personal data — with no bearing on a person’s legal identity.

However, as we will see, this conception leads to many difficulties.

It would have been more coherent to maintain a clear distinction between sex and gender, rather than giving the same term — sex — two radically different meanings that can result in a person being assigned a legal sex that is the exact opposite of their biological sex.

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C. Arguments Sometimes Put Forward to Support the Confusion Between Sex and Gender

23. In order to assimilate sex to gender, some have attempted to argue that, ultimately, there is no reason to categorize humanity into two distinct “sexes,” and that only gender should henceforth be considered — which would mean speaking solely of each human being’s specific gender, and dismissing the concept of sex altogether.

Two main arguments are frequently cited in this regard. This has sometimes been referred to as “gender theory.” However, in my view, these ideologically motivated arguments can be scientifically refuted with relative ease.

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Sex is said to be a social construct

Drawing on the analysis that masculine and feminine gender representations are often social and cultural constructs, some authors — most notably the American philosopher Judith Butler[^26] — have gone further, claiming that the very recognition of two different sexes within the human species is itself a social construction.

According to this view, it is merely a performative or procedural act that has instituted two “categories” of human beings — men and women — and arbitrarily created a “heteronormative order,” that is, the binary of sex, with the purpose of enabling men to dominate women and heterosexuals to dominate homosexuals.

Thus, the sex recorded on each person’s birth certificate would have been arbitrarily “assigned” by the State.

To end this “domination,” it is now proposed that we must also “deconstruct” these two categories and abolish the distinction between sexes[^27], so that the concept of sex itself would lose all relevance.

But here again lies a deep confusion.

Certainly, it is evident that categories, like concepts, are human constructions. And they are particularly useful, as they allow us — through language, which is intrinsic to the human condition — to represent real-world differences: day and night, life and death, lion and gazelle…

These constructions, however, are not the result of unrestrained or delusional imagination. They are the product of rigorous observation and analysis of the human-inhabited world.

The categories of “male sex” and “female sex” are indeed human constructs — but built upon empirical reality: that of things as they are, which impose themselves upon us. Men and women are different, due to the biological characteristics with which they are respectively endowed, from embryonic development onward and throughout their lives.

Claiming that the sex distinction does not exist is thus, ironically, a form of imaginary construction. The fact that societies have historically built representations or norms based on that difference — sometimes to justify male power over women — does not mean that men and women themselves are fictitious constructs with no “natural” reality.

Just as the Amazon rainforest does not cease to exist because it has been exploited or named by humans, so too does the biological reality of sex remain, regardless of cultural overreach. What needs to be deconstructed are the justifications for domination, not the natural realities they exploit.

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The existence of intersex variations

Another argument relies on the existence of so-called intersex persons — individuals born with biological characteristics that span both sexes of the human species.

From this, some infer that there exists a spectrum of sex configurations, thereby challenging the categories of male and female sex.

These situations are indeed complex and must be treated with the deepest respect, both medically and legally.

However, on the one hand, these are unfortunately developmental anomalies — just as many others exist — arising during human development from fertilization onward (i.e., from the union of male and female gametes). These anomalies are rare, even though reported statistics may vary widely depending on the viewpoint of those citing them.

On the other hand, intersex conditions do not amount to a third sex. On the contrary, they confirm that biological characteristics remain either male or female.

When some transgender individuals claim a non-binary gender identity, considering themselves neither male nor female, this is clearly a matter of gender identity — and does not imply that there are more than two sexes in the human species, nor that the sex distinction is non-existent.

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§2. The Problematic Effects of the Confusion Between Sex and Gender

Progressively reducing sex to gender — even going so far as to claim that gender alone constitutes sex — has led, both symbolically and in terms of its legal consequences, to effects that are at the very least problematic.

A. The Blurring of Reality

It must be clearly stated that, in a democratic society, there can be no objection to what transgender individuals express regarding the distress they feel due to a mismatch between their inner experience and their sex. What they express must, of course, be heard and respected.

On the one hand, any act of violence, insult, or contempt is unacceptable, just as it would be toward anyone — even though such violence, insults, and contempt continue to be common in personal, social, and even political life[^28].

On the other hand, it is right that our legal systems seek to respond appropriately to such situations, however difficult it may be to find the most adequate solution.

What is at issue, however, is what legal systems have enacted when they decided that, based solely on a transgender person’s gender identity, it could be formally recognized that the person “belongs” to a different sex than their own — especially when they still retain all the physical characteristics of that sex.

As previously noted (see supra §22), an attempt was made to escape this contradiction by proposing that a person’s “legal sex,” recorded in civil registries, may have no longer any connection to what is now termed “biological sex”, with all the legal consequences that would entail.

But sex is a biological reality — and it cannot be erased with a legal pen stroke.

Making people believe — the person in question and the rest of society — that someone no longer has any sex other than their “legal sex,” when in fact only their gender identity differs from their biological sex, amounts to erasing reality, or rather, pretending reality does not exist[^29].

But reality — even when repressed — always returns.

Unless science and medicine were to one day produce only sexless human beings, the difference between the sexes is an essential dimension of the human condition — and cannot be sidestepped.

It is precisely this illusion — that we could bypass the sex distinction (even though it’s hard to pinpoint exactly how we got here) — that now confronts us with numerous difficulties.

I will mention only a few, but the most significant is the one relating to procreation and parentage.

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B. Procreation and the Parentage of Children

As long as a child can only be conceived by a woman and a man — that is, a human being of the female sex and one of the male sex — and as long as only a female can carry and give birth to a child, then we encounter a real impasse.

This impasse arises when a human of biological male sex conceives a child using his gametes, yet is legally recognized as being of the female sex; or when a person of biological female sex carries and gives birth to a child, but is legally recognized as male.

This dilemma was clearly expressed by Professor Pierre Murat, who referred to these situations, in his previously cited contribution, as having “devastating consequences.”

There are three possibilities:

a) One might ignore the legal sex of a parent, when it does not match their biological sex, and instead acknowledge biological reality as the only valid basis for understanding the child’s origin. In that case, the child can only be identified as having been conceived by a man (father) — even if legally recorded as a woman — and/or born to a woman (mother) — even if legally recorded as a man[^30].

b) Alternatively, one might give precedence to legal sex over biological reality, and consider as a “mother” the man who became a woman and conceived the child with male gametes, or as a “father” the woman who became a man and gave birth.

c) Or, confronted with such legal and logical confusion, one might “give up” — that is, avoid choosing between these two contradictory positions. In doing so, society would impose the notion that neither biological sex nor legal sex exists, that there are no more men or women, no more mothers or fathers. All individuals involved in the procreation of a child would be legally considered sexless persons, and the child would be recorded simply as being born of two “persons.” This would amount to a legal and social erasure of sexual difference.

Where is the mistake?

Is it not precisely in having too hastily equated gender with sex?

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The European Court of Human Rights was indeed confronted with the consequences of a principle it may not have fully foreseen — or in any case not anticipated in depth — when it recognized the right to change one’s sex (not just one’s gender identity) without being required to undergo sterilization.

The Court was seized of two cases brought against Germany:

• The first involved a person born female who had been legally recognized as male, and who, after conceiving a child via sperm donation and giving birth, had unsuccessfully requested to be listed on the child’s birth certificate as the father, instead of as the mother[^31].

• The second concerned a person born male, legally recognized as female, who had conceived a child with their partner using their own sperm and wanted to be listed as the child’s mother, while refusing to acknowledge legal paternity[^32].

In both rulings — H. and G.H. v. Germany and A.H. and others v. Germany, delivered on April 4, 2023 — the European Court of Human Rights granted States a wide margin of appreciation, and found that the judgments handed down by the German Federal Court of Justice had “struck a fair balance” between the rights of the transgender individuals, the interests and well-being of the child, and the public interest.

The Court emphasized the child’s right to a stable legal connection, based on the biological roles of the individuals involved in procreation, namely to a mother and a father.

Professor Pierre Murat expressed a similar view when he concluded his piece with these words:

“The purely intimate and identity-based approach that has prevailed thus far in matters of transsexualism now runs up against the law of parentage — because this field forces us to think not only in terms of individual self-determination, but also in terms of relationships between multiple people: parentage is a link, and each party to that link has the right to see it structured meaningfully. In short, parentage reintroduces a collective dimension that cannot be ignored.”

C. Potential Violations of the Integrity and Rights of Women

The principle of reality—in this case, the biological reality of sex—has once again reemerged when men legally recognized as female have demanded to be recognized as women among other women, without consideration for the discomfort or negative impact this may cause them.

Examples of such difficulties have multiplied, especially since men can now be legally classified as female, even while retaining all physical traits of the male sex.

The threat to women’s privacy or physical integrity in spaces intended and reserved for them—such as locker room showers or women’s prison wings—is already a concern in itself.

However, this issue has arisen most prominently—and continues to do so—in the realm of sports competitions, regularly placing sports federations in difficult positions.

It is not within my expertise to assess the specific performance impact of retaining a biologically male body in women’s sports competitions, nor the potential performance gap caused by physiological factors such as testosterone levels, height, musculature, bone density, and respiratory capacity, or even the possible mitigation of this gap when an athlete reduces testosterone levels for at least one year, as some guidelines require[^33].

Yet, how can we reconcile this with the fact that, at the very moment when societies are finally prioritizing the protection of women from domestic and intimate partner violence—and especially femicides—we are simultaneously witnessing the progressive erasure of sexual difference?

What deeply disturbs many women in these demands—particularly when expressed with virulence—is the perception of a new form of dominance being exercised over them by “men”, under the pretext that their gender identity now qualifies them—to use this ambiguous phrasing—as female[^34].

And again, what lies at the root of this issue?

Is it not the hasty conflation of gender and sex?

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D. Problematic Effects on the Physical and Psychological Development of Children and Adolescents

This is undeniably another concern that has recently escalated. A growing number of children and especially adolescents now feel uncertain about their gender and sex, questioning whether they were “born in the wrong body”, and in some cases even becoming convinced of it.

In a book that raised an alarm in France over a phenomenon that can at the very least be described as “troubling”, child psychiatrist Caroline ELIACHEFF and psychology professor Céline MASSON[^35] reported that diagnoses of gender dysphoria among children and adolescents had risen in the United States and Europe by between 1,000% and 4,000% over a 10 to 15-year period. Moreover, young girls represent the majority of these cases. This phenomenon has also been extensively documented by Marie-Jo BONNET, a historian and women’s history expert, and Nicole ATHÉA, a gynecologist and endocrinologist[^36].

As is often the case with controversial publications, some interpret this trend as the result of greater visibility for a long-silenced form of suffering, while others view it instead as the manufacture of distress, born from societies in which young people now struggle to identify with their sexed bodies, in part because clear and stable reference points have been eroded—particularly due to ideological movements promoting their narratives and demands on a mass scale[^37].

At the very least, what has been called into question is the direction taken by certain medical, advocacy, and political spheres, which have responded to the exponential rise in young people expressing trans identities by quickly endorsing their wish to transition—not only socially, if not yet legally, but more critically through the administration of medical treatments such as puberty blockers, cross-sex hormones, and in some cases, even mastectomies performed on teenage girls[^38].

It was in this context that ELIACHEFF and MASSON felt compelled to warn healthcare professionals and political leaders about what they feared could become a public health scandal, due to the potentially irreversible effects of these treatments. For this, however, they were accused of transphobia[^39]—on the grounds that they supposedly downplayed the persistent distress experienced by these young people if their desire to transition were not fulfilled.

Meanwhile, a report published in the United Kingdom[^40] on the problematic effects of puberty blockers and cross-sex hormones administered to adolescents has led to greater caution in clinical practices, despite earlier expectations of benefit. Even though the report was based on scientific methodology, it was immediately criticized.

This shows just how much controversy has been stirred by what is, rightly or wrongly, referred to as “gender theory.”

Beyond the medical debate over whether such treatments may be too dangerous to prescribe, another equally important question arises: How best can we support adolescents who question their sexed identity—a process entirely understandable amid the upheaval of puberty—and who struggle to come to terms with their changing bodies?

Regardless, adolescents cannot escape the psychological task of integrating the constraints and realities inherent in being human and living in society.

Might we be offering them a shortcut, by suggesting too quickly that changing their body—or simply their gender identity—will resolve the discomfort they feel during adolescence?

It is a complex issue, and no one today can claim to hold an absolute truth, especially since each situation differs.

But here again, suggesting that one can easily ignore biological reality may only heighten the difficulty for some children and adolescents in integrating the foundational markers necessary for their physical and psychological development.

Our legal system has undeniably contributed to this ideological drift, most likely without full awareness from national, European, or international lawmakers of the consequences of blurring biological reality—since their primary, and certainly legitimate, concern was to uphold the demand for protection and self-determination by transgender people.

But by gradually confusing gender with sex, it has—at least in my own view—blurred the boundaries, because sex remains a biological reality that the law, too, cannot simply ignore.

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[^3]: S. de Beauvoir, Le deuxième sexe, T. I, Les faits et les mythes, T. II, L’expérience vécue, Gallimard, 1949.

[^4]: F. Héritier, Masculin/Féminin. La pensée de la différence, Odile Jacob, 1996.

[^5]: Le terme « biologiques » regroupe les différences génétiques, anatomiques, physiologiques entre l’homme et la femme ; cf. C. Junien et N. Priollaud, C’est votre sexe qui fait la différence, Plon, 2019.

[^6]: Cette question est souvent posée avant la naissance, lors des échographies prénatales.

[^7]: Lorsque la disposition légale du Code Napoléon relative à l’acte de naissance fut rédigée, c’était la seule signification concevable.

[^8]: « Expressions de genre » désignent la manière dont les femmes et les hommes expriment leurs aspects féminins ou masculins.

[^9]: Par exemple, certains souhaiteraient supprimer les jouets genrés pour libérer les enfants de ces stéréotypes.

[^10]: Cf. débats sur les différences cérébrales ou comportementales potentielles entre sexes.

[^11]: Dans le gouvernement fédéral belge 2019-2024, création d’un secrétariat d’État à l’égalité des genres.

[^12]: L’Institut fédéral belge pour l’égalité des femmes et des hommes utilise toujours la référence au sexe.

[^13]: La Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles et d’autres institutions parlent d’égalité de genre dans leurs politiques.

[^14]: Ces termes ont eux-mêmes été substitués à celui de « trouble de l’identité de genre » qui avait été jugé stigmatisant.

[^15]: Ibid.

[^15]: Cette ambiguïté complique la perception de la transidentité, car elle peut faire perdre de vue que certaines personnes transgenres n’auraient aucune « liberté » quelconque au regard de leur dysphorie de genre.

[^16]: Loi du 10 mai 2007 « relative à la transsexualité ». Ce terme de « transsexualité » a dû procéder d’une erreur, car il s’agissait bien à l’époque de ce qu’on appelait le « transsexualisme ».

[^17]: Comme on le sait, c’est ce que la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme décida explicitement dans son arrêt A.P., Garçon et Nicot c/ France du 6 avril 2017, en se référant au surplus à diverses déclarations d’acteurs institutionnels européens et internationaux.

[^18]: La nouvelle loi belge du 25 juin 2017 fut intitulée comme étant la loi « réformant des régimes relatifs aux personnes transgenres en ce qui concerne la mention d’une modification de l’enregistrement du sexe dans les actes de l’état civil et ses effets ».

[^19]: On relèvera que, dans son arrêt A.P., Garçon et Nicot du 6 avril 2017, la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme n’avait par contre pas estimé qu’il était contraire aux dispositions de la Convention qu’un Etat subordonne la modification de la mention du sexe d’une personne dans son acte de naissance à la preuve de la réalité du « syndrome sexuel » dont elle est affectée et, dès lors, à une obligation pour elle de subir un examen médical.

[^20]: En raison de la refonte progressive des différents livres du Code civil belge, les livres et titres, tels que le Livre premier, qui n’ont pas encore fait l’objet de cette refonte se retrouvent désormais dans ce que le législateur a qualifié d’« ancien Code civil », alors même qu’ils sont toujours en vigueur.

[^21]: Une disposition spécifique a été prévue pour les mineurs non émancipés de plus de 16 ans.

[^22]: Le Procureur du Roi ne pourrait rendre un avis négatif qu’« en raison d’une contrariété à l’ordre public ». Ce qui fut visé, c’était l’hypothèse où la personne concernée serait recherchée et tenterait de masquer son identité.

[^23]: Même si la législation française est moins libérale que la législation belge, elle aboutit, en définitive, au même résultat. Sans doute, une décision judiciaire reste-t-elle requise, et la personne concernée devra-t-elle, aux termes de l’article 61-5 du Code civil, « démontrer » au magistrat qu’elle « se présente dans le sexe » dont elle sollicite qu’il soit désormais fait mention. Mais, concrètement, dès lors que plus aucune modification de sa constitution physique ne peut a priori être exigée, c’est l’« identité de genre » éprouvée par cette personne telle qu’elle l’aura exprimée en société qui conduira à la modification de la mention de son « sexe ».

[^24]: Arrêt nº 99/2019 prononcé le 19 juin 2019.

[^25]: Voy., par exemple, l’utilisation systématique de ce concept par P. Michel, Réflexions sur le devenir des catégories juridiques de mère et de père à l’aune de la parenté transgenre, in H. Bosse-Platière, Y. Favier, H. Fulchiron et A. Gouttenoire (dir.), Les métamorphoses du droit de la famille. En hommage à Jacqueline Rubellin-Devichi, Edilaix, 2003, p. 279. Alors que le langage juridique ne connaissait que le terme de « sexe » qui renvoyait aux caractéristiques biologiques de la personne, cette nouvelle conception d’un « sexe juridique » permet précisément d’y intégrer un « sexe » qui serait même sans aucun lien avec les caractéristiques biologiques et physiques de la personne.

[^26]: J. Butler, Gender Trouble. Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, Routledge Kegan and Paul, 1990, publié en 2005 en langue française aux Éditions La Découverte sous le titre Trouble dans le genre. Le féminisme et la subversion de l’identité.

[^27]: Voy., D. Borillo, Pour une théorie du droit des personnes et de la famille émancipée du genre, in N. Gallus (dir.), Droit des familles, Genre et sexualité, Anthemis, 2012, p. 23, qui écrivait que la différence des sexes n’aurait été qu’« une réalité symbolique fondée sur la croyance de la suprématie culturelle de l’hétérosexualité » et qu’« il faudrait donc, conformément à la tradition républicaine française, bannir le ‘sexe’ (comme catégorie d’identification) de tous les documents d’identité, à commencer par l’acte de naissance et le numéro de la sécurité sociale ».

[^28]: C’est, semble-t-il, devenu un problème sociétal plus général cette profusion d’insultes, voire de menaces qui sont distillées quotidiennement en privé, dans le débat public ou sur les réseaux sociaux, comme s’il était devenu difficile à la fois de parler de manière nuancée lorsqu’on entend exprimer une opinion et à la fois de ne pas immédiatement disqualifier celles et ceux qui expriment une opinion différente.

[^29]: Ce n’est pas différent d’un autre phénomène sociétal qui caractérise nos sociétés individualistes et que le sociologue Alain ERALY a à juste titre présenté comme « l’essor de la vérité subjective », c’est-à-dire cette propension à tenir pour vrai ce qu’une personne a seulement considéré ou ressenti comme vrai (A. ERALY, Une démocratie sans autorité ? Erès, 2018, chap. 6, L’essor de la vérité subjective, p. 141 et s.). Ce qui est probablement subjectivement vrai, c’est que cette personne le ressent (encore que d’aucuns peuvent être bien conscients qu’ils ne disent pas la vérité). Mais ce n’est pas parce que la personne le ressent que c’est objectivement vrai.

[^30]: Le législateur belge a ainsi considéré, en ce qui concerne la mère de l’enfant, qu’il n’était pas à ce point possible de gommer la réalité biologique. Il a dès lors rendu applicables à cette situation les dispositions régissant la filiation maternelle (art. 135/2 § 2 al. 1 Code civil belge), et la personne transgenre qui a accouché de l’enfant – quand bien même elle a été identifiée comme un « homme » – sera considérée dans l’acte de naissance de l’enfant comme étant sa « mère ».

[^31]: Cette personne avait aussi revendiqué en vain que le sexe de l’enfant ne soit pas mentionné dans son acte de naissance.

[^32]: Pour être précis, le premier recours avait été introduit également au nom de l’enfant, tandis que le second recours avait aussi été introduit tant par la compagne devenue mère de l’enfant qu’au nom de l’enfant.

[^33]: Il n’est guère possible de recenser ici les positions divergentes qui ont été prises à cet égard par les fédérations internationales ou nationales de chaque discipline sportive. À titre de simple exemple, on relèvera qu’après qu’une femme transgenre, qui concourait à l’origine avec les hommes, avait remporté une épreuve féminine de nage des championnats universitaires américains, la fédération internationale de natation a adopté en 2022 une politique durcissant considérablement les conditions d’éligibilité des athlètes transgenres aux compétitions féminines. Ce type de décision est controversé, au motif qu’elle pourrait être discriminatoire. Sans chercher à se prononcer sur le fond d’une question complexe, on soulignera simplement qu’il est a priori difficile de voir une discrimination là où les situations sont objectivement différentes d’un point de vue biologique, sauf à considérer qu’il n’y aurait plus à prendre en considération que le seul sexe dit juridique. Mais n’est-ce pas la démonstration que ce concept peut être en décalage avec la « réalité », a fortiori lorsqu’un changement de sexe « juridique » n’est plus soumis à la moindre condition et peut résulter d’une libre déclaration de la personne concernée ?

[^34]: Doit-on rappeler que le fondateur des Jeux Olympiques modernes, Pierre de Coubertin, en avait exclu les femmes et que celles-ci ne purent enfin obtenir qu’après de longs combats d’être présentes dans toutes les disciplines sportives ?

[^35]: C. ELIACHEFF et C. MASSON, La fabrique de l’enfant transgenre, Éditions de l’Observatoire, 2022.

[^36]: M.J. BONNET et N. ATHÉA, Quand les filles deviennent des garçons, Odile Jacob, 2023.

[^37]: Lorsque, par exemple, on en vient à considérer qu’il conviendrait d’expliquer aux enfants de cinq à huit ans, dans le cadre de l’éducation sexuelle à l’école, que l’« identité de genre peut être identique ou différente, se rapprocher, s’éloigner, correspondre, ne pas correspondre, différer, osciller… de celle assignée à la naissance » (p. 160 du Guide pour l’éducation relationnelle, affective et sexuelle adopté en Belgique francophone le 7 juillet 2023 et publié au Moniteur belge du 25 mars 2024), on est peut-être animé de la volonté de diffuser un esprit de tolérance dans le milieu scolaire mais on diffuse dans le même temps un message qui trouble précisément pour les enfants les repères clairs et stables d’autrefois.

[^38]: Les bloqueurs de puberté sont des hormones de synthèse qui, à l’apparition de la puberté, permettent d’éviter la sécrétion des hormones sexuelles naturelles (œstrogènes pour les filles et testostérone pour les garçons) à la base des changements physiques survenant chez les adolescents.

[^39]: Pareille accusation est aussitôt formulée dès que des acteurs scientifiques et médicaux incitent ne fût-ce qu’à la prudence ou font valoir que les effets de ces traitements sur la santé physique et psychique de ces jeunes n’ont pas été suffisamment analysés et documentés, comme il en est et doit en être de tout traitement médical. Cette accusation est même parfois formulée de manière violente et/ou menaçante. Il est ainsi inquiétant que Caroline ELIACHEFF et Céline MASSON aient pu provoquer une levée de boucliers de celles et ceux qu’on appelle aujourd’hui les « transactivistes », comme s’il leur était comminé de se taire, au prétexte précisément que leur interpellation serait « transphobe ». C’est ainsi qu’elles ont subi une attaque aux excréments d’une vingtaine de militants cagoulés au Café Laïque de Bruxelles, car les organisateurs ne s’étaient pas pliés à leur injonction d’annuler la conférence qu’elles allaient y donner en décembre 2022.

[^40]: Le rapport « Cass » intitulé Independent review of gender identity services for children and young people est une évaluation qui avait été commandée par le Service national de santé britannique au docteur Hillary CASS, une pédiatre qui avait présidé le « Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health ». Son rapport définitif a été publié en 2024 et comporte 32 recommandations.